

~~TOP SECRET~~

Part B. Commendations by Allied Authorities

a. Commendations by Australians

A cryptanalytical success of considerable importance brought recognition from the Australian unit at Melbourne:

No. 1

12 January 1945

From: FRUMEL
Action: DAZE 121135

FRUMEL will reciprocate with a case of Melbourne bitters if Negat supplies under lend lease a duplicate of the crystal ball used to unravel the [redacted]. Congratulations on a magnificent piece of work.

On 23 May 1945 Admiral Guy Foyle, Chief of Staff, Royal Australian Navy, sent the following communication to the Director of Naval Communications:

No. 2

23 May 1945

Commonwealth of Australia
Department of the Navy
Navy Office, Melbourne, S.C. 1

My dear Redman

On relinquishing my appointment as Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Navy, I would like to express thanks for the great assistance rendered to me as Commander South West Pacific Sea Frontiers by your Communications Intelligence organization.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 2 (Cont.)

I also appreciate very much the continued help you have given us since FRUMEL was transferred to the control of the R.A.N. . . .

With kindest regards, I remain

Yours sincerely

Guy Royle

b. Commendations by the British

During the course of the war in the Pacific, the British congratulated Op-20-G on many cryptanalytical successes. Pertinent messages from the authorities of the British Government Code and Cipher School follow:

No. 3

4 June 1943

From: GCCS
Action: OPNAV 040932 CANDO ULTRA

Hearty congratulations on breaking the new indicator system so soon and so effectively.

No. 4

10 November 1943

From: GCCS
Action: OPNAV
Info: WX 517 100901Z CANDO ULTRA

We would like to offer you our hearty congratulations on getting into ^{*} what must be the shortest time on record. ; in

*Principal Japanese Navy code.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 5

1 January 1944

From: GCCS
Action: OPNAV 010836 CANDO ULTRA

Now that * system is solved necessity for cabling material no longer exists. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

*Japanese Navy.

No. 6

14 January 1944

From: GCCS
Action: OPNAV for Op-20-G 191019Z WX721 CANDO

Your R.I. and R.I. Summaries greatly appreciated here. Same applies to crypto-intelligence daily summaries. Many thanks.

No. 7

14 February 1944

From: GCCS
Action: OPNAV for Op-20-G
Info: 111412Z WX115 CANDO ULTRA

Congratulations on your very successful work in getting into the new *.

*Principal Japanese Navy code.

No. 8

22 February 1944

From: GCCS
Action: OPNAV 211721/Z

Very pleased to have your reconstruction of the

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 8 (Cont.)

Jade* keyboard and would be interested in further details.

*Japanese Navy cipher machine.

No. 9

18 March 1944

From: GCCS
Action: OPNAV 171553Z

Many congratulations on your reconstruction of wheels of * . Much impressed by your phenomenal progress after original break.

*Japanese Naval cipher machine.

No. 10

9 May 1944

From: GCCS
Action: Op-20-G 081549Z

Warmest congratulations from our # party and the rest of us on your very important discovery of relationship between and **

*Japanese Naval additive cipher.
**Japanese Naval cipher machine.

No. 11

30 May 1944

From: GCCS
Action: Op-20-G AI 14475

Congratulations your break in *.

*Japanese Naval cipher machine.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 12

2 November 1944

From: GCCS
Action: Op-20-G 021505

Congratulations on your progress with * !
We are clearing the decks to take on code, and
await further details from you.

*Principal Japanese Navy code.

No. 13

5 May 1945

From: GCCS
Action: NEGAT 051338

Congratulations on speedy solution of new indi-
cator procedure on * and . In view of
your success there is no point in our continuing
to receive headings. Thank you for sending
them to date.

*Japanese Naval auxiliary code.

No. 14

17 May 1945

From: GCCS
Action: NEGAT 170901

Congratulations on !*. We eagerly await full
report. Please signal immediately order of letters in
input.

*Japanese Naval code.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 15

18 May 1945

From: GCCS
Action: NEGAT 181040

* , Heartiest congratulations on a brilliant piece of work.

*Japanese Naval code.

No. 16

18 June 1945

From: GCCS
To: Op-20-G

GCCS has requested me to convey their congratulations on your solution of

No. 17

6 July 1945

From: FRUEF
Action: NEGAT

Congratulations on speed of recovery in this phase.

This completes the list of specific commendations for the contributions of communication intelligence to the success of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. The next chapter will contain citations indicating the important role played by Op-20-G in the war in the Atlantic and European theaters.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHAPTER II

COMMENDATIONS OF OP-20-G FOR COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN THEATERS

During the course of the war in the Atlantic many commendations were received from the British in regard to the speedy decipherment of German messages in machine systems which the enemy and many others believed to be unbreakable.

No. 1

5 February 1943

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

Many thanks for the Limpets. (Offizier Traffic)..

No. 2

March 1943

From: GCCS
To : OPNAV 161521

"---- Congratulations from , on colossal
Bovril* week."

*Machine assigned to German Air Force problems.

No. 3

November 1943

From: AMNAVDEL (London)
To : Op-20-G 221433

"-----work done by you very much appreciated
here and many worthwhile jobs have been done that
could not otherwise have been attempted."

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 5

11 July 1944

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

...Duenna* will be of vital importance to us...

*High speed analytical machine

No. 6

17 August 1944

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

171431

Most grateful for your work on Rocket* 2 and 3 which effectively proves that these keys are not on Rocket machine. Further attempts to break will therefore be made on assumption that they use normal machine.

*Unknown German Air Force keys.

No. 7

17 August 1944

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

171432

Assistance of Bovril* bombes is found invaluable by

*See No. 2.

No. 8

17 November 1944

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

170856

Congratulations from all on

* break.

No. 9

26 December 1944

From: AMNAVDEL

260953

Hearty congratulations from AMNAVDEL to Duenna* party.

*See No. 5

No. 10

26 December 1944

From: GCCS

To : Op-20-3

261046

Heartiest congratulations on Duenna* success. Puma** is key of first class importance which we were most anxious to break.

*See No. 5

**German Army key.

No. 11

27 December 1944

From: GCCS

To : NEGAT

261923

Congratulations on good work by Duenna*.

*See No. 5

No. 12

27 December 1944

From: GCCS

271803

Your Duenna* success has enabled us to read Puma** 17 through 23 December with a chance that either 16 or 24 will follow.

*See No. 5

**See No. 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 13

30 January 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

301604

Congratulations on Duenna Greenshank* break.
Intelligence value high but Greenshank Dora** now
suspected daily affair.

*German Army key.

**

No. 14

1 February 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

011303

Many thanks break H-27 which is most welcome as
no Puma* read since 7th. Break of H-21 secured H-19
on same key.

*See No. 10.

No. 15

13 February 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

130944

Very many thanks for particularly successful
Bovril* work (29 breaks) during last four days.

*See No. 2.

No. 16

11 March 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-G

Many thanks for quick break and complete solution
of H-38*.

*German Army system.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 17

11 March 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-3 112105

Congratulations on H-35, todays second very welcome Duenna* break.

*See No. 5.

No. 18

3 April 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-3 031949

Many thanks for grand work on Jaguar*. Quick break most valuable.

No. 19

6 April 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-3 061021

Congratulations on Sonder* break and very interesting information.

*Special submarine key.

No. 20

8 May 1945

From: GCCS
To : Op-20-3 081047

Thank you for very successful results (re Hypo* work on Dolphin)**

*High speed analytical machine recovering settings.
**Northern submarine key.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 21

10 May 1945

From: GOCGS
To : Op-20-G

Your telegram GYA 570 deeply appreciated by all of us here. Op-20's invaluable loyal help and cooperation will remain one of our happiest memories. We are with you now to help as and how best we can in what remains of the war against Japan.

No. 22

24 May 1945

From: GOCGS
To : Op-20-G

241749

On closing down this correspondence would like to convey our great appreciation of Duenna's* successes and of our very friendly relations.

*See No. 5.

The following comments are taken from the GC & CS history of work on the Enigma. Since they were obtained from material which apparently was not intended for our perusal, it is believed that they represent the true British evaluation of our contribution. Their comment on our concentration on the Shark problem is explained by the fact that we were determined to get the submarine problem under control, after which our interests became more widespread.

No. 23

Op-20-G

Before attempting to assess the value of the contribution of Op-20-G, which was immense, and also the difficulties which arose, which were fairly numerous,

~~TOP SECRET~~

it is essential to understand that they were very different from ourselves in their fundamental organization. They were second in the field and agreed, and kept to the agreement, to play second fiddle and so naturally the people they put into their German machine cryptography were not the best cryptographers they had, but rather efficient and intelligent organizers with cryptographic knowledge. Also most of them started at a time when every member of _____ had at least 2 years invaluable and varied experience of machine cryptography and doubtless mistakes they made were only the same mistakes as we ourselves had been making 2 years before. Their organization and its machinery was created for the special problem of Shark [Atlantic U-boat keys] and was staffed with Naval personnel; there existed no cooperation between the services comparable to that existing between ourselves, _____ Naval Section and _____ and they had not the knowledge of or the dealings with other machine keys which we had over here; it was therefore natural, however regrettable, that they should tend to be narrow minded and to regard Shark as the only really important thing in life. This attitude let it be said at once, was rapidly thrown over by such people as Commander Engstrom, Lt. Commander Church, and the series of U.S.N. liaison officers in this Section and we could be sure at all times of their cooperation in any scheme calculated to increase the return to be got from the bombes.

In the course of 1944 it became obvious that Op-20-G were as well qualified as ourselves to decide which Shark _____ were worth running and by half way through 1944 they had taken over complete control of Shark and undoubtedly knew far more about the key than we did. Our function was to send reencodements from Narwhal or Plalice as they occurred and we played no part in the _____ The number of days they broke in _____ with comparatively small expenditure of bombe time in the very _____ days which followed the death of Biscay Weather represent an extremely fine achievement.

The acceptance by Op-20-G of the principle of pooled bombe resources was a fairly slow one. An analysis at the end of 1943 of the bombe time used per day's traffic read on various Naval keys showed that on Porpoise the average number of hours was 9, Grampus 11,

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Dolphin 74, Sunfish 186(?), Seahorse 280, Shark 500, Turtle 1500.....On this the Weekly Report comments:

"We are asking the Americans to give Bovril jobs preference over weak Turtle menus as these give such poor return for money."

By the time the Second Front opened very close and efficient cooperation existed. Priorities of keys were decided at weekly meetings at which the U.S.N. representative was present and Op-20-G stuck most loyally to the priorities as laid down, running a vast number of jobs and enabling them to break keys which would otherwise have remained unbroken. I think it is a considerable tribute to the good sense of all parties concerned, and most especially to Op-20-G who were in a somewhat irksome position, that relations were at all times extremely cordial and that it was possible to get so much work so efficiently done when the machinery had to be shared by 3 groups of people, each feeling at heart that their own particular problem was the one which really mattered.

The credit for reviving the cipher used between Berlin and Tokyo) in 1944 goes entirely to Op-20-G who reaped their reward in the great interest shown in the key not only in America but also in Naval Section who came to regret their erstwhile disdainful attitude.

To Op-20-G goes the credit for discovering how the Starfish 3 keys worked. Starfish were groups of traffic externally similar to Sunfish but using different individual blockade runners. Starfish 3 was built up from the Sunfish keys on a principle; the first Starfish break was made in December 1943, and discovery of the Starfish 3 relationship came in March 1944.

Breaking of Porpoise was possible on the American bombs and intensive research produced a number of excellent . . . Breaking of Porpoise on . . . gave

~~TOP SECRET~~

The discovery of _____ reflects
very little credit on _____ Most of the work was
done in May 1944 at Op-20-G by Lt. Comdr. Church and
his assistants. There is no doubt that we had paid
insufficient attention to the study of
and by our failure had wasted a considerable amount
of _____ time in the past.